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Abstract 
Using a sample of 2,827 firms from 21 countries we examine whether insider trading laws achieve the 
primary objective for which they are introduced – protecting uninformed investors from private 
information-based trading. We find that when control is concentrated in the hands of a large shareholder, 
insider trading regulation is less effective in reducing private information-based trading if investor 
protection is poor. We suggest that controlling shareholders who are banned from trading may resort to 
covert expropriation of firm resources, creating more information asymmetry and thereby encouraging 
private information trading by informed outsiders. Consistent with this, we find evidence that when the 
rights of controlling shareholders are high, insider trading restrictions are associated with greater earnings 
opacity.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a long standing debate in the finance, economics, and law literatures about the need for 
insider trading regulation. Its critics argue that allowing insiders to trade on material nonpublic 
information may be value-enhancing (Carlton and Fischel (1983), Dye (1984)). Its proponents, however, 
contend that insider trading subjects uninformed outsiders to an adverse selection problem, discourages 
investment, and damages corporate value (Manove (1989), Ausubel (1990), Fischer (1992)). Moreover, 
allowing insiders to trade at the expense of uninformed outsiders diminishes investor confidence and hurts 
the integrity of capital markets (Brudney (1979), Easterbrook (1985), Glosten (1989), Maug (1995, 
1999)).  
In keeping with this view, many countries have adopted insider trading regulations. A survey by 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) finds that out of 103 countries that have stock markets, 87 have 
introduced insider trading rules. The principal goal of insider trading regulations appears to be to prevent 
informationally disadvantaged investors from being treated ‘unfairly’ by corporate insiders, who profit 
from information not available to the general public. In many of these countries, however, investor 
protection laws are poor and control rights are concentrated in the hands of one or a few large 
shareholders, who are, in effect, corporate insiders with easy access to nonpublic information. For these 
reasons, the amount of private information trading and the effectiveness of insider trading regulation in 
reducing private information trading may vary dramatically across countries. 
This paper examines whether insider trading regulation achieves its principal goal of protecting 
uninformed investors and how its effectiveness varies depending on the concentration of control rights 
and protection of minority shareholders. Specifically, we ask the following questions. Do insider trading 
restrictions reduce private information trading? Does the presence of large shareholders with concentrated 
control rights and poor investor protection affect the amount of private information trading and the 
effectiveness of insider trading restrictions?  
We assume that both insiders and informed outsiders (whom we sometimes refer to as market 
professionals) can trade on private information. However, whereas insiders have ready access to private 
information and are banned from trading in countries with strict insider trading regulation, informed 
outsiders must acquire information at a cost and are not restricted from trading. Throughout the paper, we 
focus on a particular group of insiders – controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders are often 
involved in the running of a firm and have private information about the firm’s operations and 
performance, which they can use to obtain trading profits. Moreover, it is shown that controlling 
shareholders can engage in expropriation of a firm’s resources through transfer pricing, tunneling, special 
dividends or outright diversion (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Johnson et al. (2000a)).    2
We suggest that controlling shareholders, in their capacity as insiders, face a trade-off between 
expropriation and insider trading. We identify conditions under which the actions of controlling 
shareholders can increase the incentive for certain outsiders to search for information from which they 
can profit. We argue that when control rights of the largest shareholders are high and protection of 
minority shareholders is poor, controlling shareholders who face trading restrictions may resort to other 
means of private benefits – expropriation. As suggested by Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), controlling 
shareholders are likely to increase opacity of the firms’ operations and performance to hide evidence of 
expropriation and to protect their control benefits. In the presence of higher information asymmetry, 
market professionals may become more active in acquiring information and trading at the expense of the 
uninformed investors. Thus, we suggest that although insider trading restrictions reduce trading by 
controlling shareholders, imposing these restrictions when control concentration is high, without 
concomitantly improving the protection of minority shareholders, can make insider trading regulation 
ineffective in protecting the ordinary investors from trading by individuals with private information.   
As in Manove (1989), Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Shin (1996), our argument advances the 
commonly held view that insider traders and informed speculators appropriate some part of the returns to 
corporate investment at the expense of uninformed shareholders. Whether the information originates 
inside the firm or is generated by external observers of the firm, as long as it remains private, it lowers the 
trading profits of uninformed investors. Our argument is also related to previous literature suggesting that 
restrictions on insider trading impose costs on insiders for which they need to be compensated (Manne 
(1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983), Roulstone (2002)). Roulstone (2002) finds that firms that restrict 
insider trading pay a compensation premium to their executives and concludes that insider trading is an 
alternative form of compensation. In a similar vein, our paper suggests that controlling shareholders who 
are unable to trade on private information seek other forms of compensation, one of which may be 
unlawful expropriation of firm resources.   
We test our predictions using a sample of 2,827 firms from 21 countries by examining firm-level 
measures of private information trading, control rights of the largest shareholder, and earnings opacity, 
and country-level statistics on insider trading and investor protection regulations. We find that 
concentrated control rights are associated with more private information trading, and that insider trading 
restrictions, on average, reduce private information trading. However, the restrictions are less effective in 
reducing private information trading for firms with more concentrated control. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the ineffectiveness of insider trading restrictions in the presence of high control rights is 
restricted to countries with poor investor protection. When investor protection is high, insider trading 
restrictions unambiguously reduce private information-based trading.    3
To test our conjecture that insider trading restrictions become ineffective because controlling 
shareholders substitute towards covert expropriation, we rely on the findings of Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) that controlling shareholders, who engage in expropriation, are likely to hide evidence of 
expropriation by manipulating financial statements. We find evidence of greater earnings opacity when 
strict insider trading restrictions are imposed on firms with concentrated control. This suggests that 
controlling shareholders have more to hide in the presence of insider trading restrictions and supports our 
conjecture that insiders are more likely to divert resources when banned from profitable trading. 
If the primary objective of insider trading restrictions is to encourage the uninformed investors to 
participate in the market, then regulators need to be wary of the effect insider trading restrictions have on 
the activities of informed outsiders. When control rights are concentrated, the restrictions may simply 
transfer profits from the insider to the informed outsider, leaving uninformed investors no better-off, 
unless the regulator ensures a concomitant improvement in investor protection standards. Countries that 
do not protect investors adequately but have strict laws against insider trading, should move quickly 
towards stronger protection of minority shareholders that would make expropriation and manipulation of 
financial statements harder. Otherwise, the costs of introducing and enforcing insider trading restrictions 
may not be worthwhile.  
Our paper is related to Beny (2002, 2003). Beny (2002) finds that more stringent insider trading laws 
are associated with greater ownership dispersion, more accurate stock prices, and more liquid equity 
markets. Beny (2003) investigates the corporate value implications of insider trading legislation and 
shows that stricter insider trading regulations are unambiguously associated with higher value in firms 
with dispersed ownership. She also finds evidence that, once potential endogeneity of ownership and 
valuation is controlled for, insider trading legislation is associated with higher corporate valuation among 
firms with concentrated control. Our paper differs from Beny (2002, 2003) in that we focus primarily on 
the effects of insider trading restrictions on private information-based trading. We also provide additional 
insights into the effects insider trading restrictions have on the incentives of controlling shareholders and 
the trading behavior of informed outsiders. Finally, we suggest an association between the effectiveness 
of insider trading restrictions and investor protection, which has not been previously recognized. 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section II presents our hypotheses. Section III describes the sample, 
variables, and empirical methodology. The empirical results and robustness checks appear in Section IV. 
Section V concludes. 
2. Hypotheses  
It is argued (Demsetz (1986) and Bhide (1993)) that large shareholders bear certain costs that diffuse 
shareholders do not. These costs of large shareholding arise from the active monitoring of firm 
management and from holding undiversified portfolios (Demsetz (1986)). Additionally, shareholders who   4
exercise control over a firm through ownership of majority stock bear the risk of being held liable for the 
acts of the corporation. Bhide (1993) suggests that, in the U.S., strict disclosure requirements and insider 
trading rules have gradually discouraged active shareholding by closing avenues through which large 
shareholders can obtain compensation for the costs.  
In other countries, however, concentrated shareholdings are common. In a study of 27 countries, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998b) find that most firms are controlled by a single large 
shareholder. How do large shareholders in these countries seek compensation for the costs they bear? 
Depending on the regulatory environment, they may be able to trade profitably on the stock market on the 
basis of insider information or they may obtain private benefits through various forms of expropriation. 
The notion that insider trading serves as a form of compensation has been explored in previous literature. 
Roulstone (2002) shows that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation 
relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. In 
this paper, we suggest that controlling shareholders banned from insider trading will seek other forms of 
compensation, one of which may be unlawful diversion of firm resources.  
We assume that a controlling shareholder benefits from the consumption of two costly goods: insider 
trading and diversion.
1 The cost of insider trading depends on the existence and enforcement of insider 
trading laws. The more strictly insider trading laws are enforced, the more likely it is that trading by 
insiders will be identified, the profits confiscated and a fine imposed. The cost of expropriating from 
minority shareholders can be thought of as the probability that the expropriation is detected and punished. 
This cost is increasing in the protection provided to minority shareholders, the enforcement of investor 
protection laws, and the amount of resources expropriated.   
We assume there is a maximum cost (probability of being caught and punished for breaking the law) 
that the controlling shareholder is willing to bear. This could be a financial constraint on the size of 
expected monetary penalties that the controlling shareholder can afford or it could be a constraint on the 
controlling shareholders’ willingness to take on the risk of being charged with a criminal offence. This 
maximum cost serves as the constraint, subject to which the controlling shareholder maximizes payoff 
when choosing between how much to trade and how much to divert. The intuition behind the controlling 
shareholder’s constrained choice is illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b.  
                                                 
1 Both corporate governance scandals (e.g., those involving Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia in the U.S. and Pramalat in 
Europe) and insider trading scandals (e.g., the cases of Andrew Fastow, the former CFO of Enron and of Samuel 
Waksal, the founder and former CEO of ImClone Systems) have attracted significant attention in the popular press 
and in the finance and law literatures. With this in mind, we assume that diversion and insider trading constitute two 
main tangible sources of unlawful benefits for controlling shareholders.   5
A controlling shareholder’s (insider’s) objective function is increasing in the consumption of two 
goods: the amounts of insider trading, x, and funds diverted, y.
2 In Figure 1a, we first consider a country 
(country A), where insider trading restrictions are non-existent or poorly enforced and therefore, the cost 
of trading profitably on the basis of material non-public information is low. Assume that the protection of 
minority shareholders is non-existent or weak. In such a situation, the insider optimally chooses some 
amounts of insider trading, xA, and expropriation, yB.  
Now consider another country (country B), where the protection of minority shareholders is weak but 
the rules against insider trading exist and are enforced. In this country, the cost of insider trading is high 
and thus the insider chooses a lower amount of insider trading, xB  <  xA. If insider trading and 
expropriation are partial substitutes, all else equal, the cost constrained controlling shareholder will 
choose more expropriation, yB > yA.  
Previous work shows that when insiders engage in the diversion of firm resources they attempt to 
mask the resulting poor performance of the firm by manipulating the firm’s financial reports (Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2001)). In country B, where controlling shareholders choose to expropriate larger 
amounts, more time and effort is spent in hiding evidence of expropriation. The greater level of these 
activities in country B relative to country A decreases the quantity and quality of information available to 
the general public in country B.  We argue below that this higher degree of information asymmetry has 
implications for the trading strategies of another group – market professionals (informed outsiders).
3  
We assume that, as in Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Shin (1996), insiders as well as market 
professionals trade on private information. As noted by Manove (1989), trading on non-public 
information is detrimental to uninformed shareholders regardless of whether the information originates 
within the firm and is used by insiders or is generated and used by professional observers of the firm. The 
difference between the two groups of informed traders is that insiders have costless access to information 
and are subject to insider trading restrictions, whereas market professionals acquire information at a cost 
and their trading is not subject to regulation. In country B, where insider trading restrictions are strict, the 
marginal profit for market professionals of acquiring costly information is higher than in country A. This 
is because first, in country B outsiders are more informationally disadvantaged due to the covert activities 
of controlling shareholders who are banned from insider trading. Second, the market professionals face 
lower competition from insiders. Due to the higher marginal benefit of information, the market 
professionals invest more in its acquisition and trade on the basis of that information at the expense of the 
                                                 
2 In this paper we use the terms “controlling shareholder” and “insider” interchangeably. Although our theoretical 
arguments hold for any insider who wields sufficient control in the firm, our empirical tests focus on a subset of 
insiders – controlling shareholders.  
3 By market professionals we refer to traders who may acquire information at a cost but are not insiders and owe no 
fiduciary duty to shareholders of the firm. Moreover, unlike analysts, the market professionals do not disseminate 
information to the public and trade for their own benefit.   6
uninformed small investors. Therefore, although insider trading restrictions in country B reduce the 
amount of trading by insiders, the restrictions can indirectly increase the amount of private information 
trading undertaken by informed outsiders.  
We are not the first to recognize the effect insider trading restrictions may have on the trading 
strategies of informed outsiders. In Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Shin (1996), insiders and market 
professionals compete for profits. Since insider trading rules restrict insiders but not market professionals, 
the competition faced by market professionals is lower in the presence of insider trading restrictions. 
Lower competition increases the marginal benefit of acquiring information for the market professional.
4  
We add to this line of thought by arguing that the effect of insider trading restrictions on the trading 
behavior of market professionals is more pronounced when control rights are high and investor protection 
is poor. When controlling shareholders are banned from trading, their main source of obtaining private 
benefits is expropriation. Arguably, the insider’s ability to expropriate resources and successfully hide 
evidence of expropriation is increasing in the level of control and decreasing in the degree of legal 
protection provided to minority shareholders. That is, when control rights of the insider are high and 
protection of minority investors is low, insiders are able to make up for lost trading profits (caused by 
insider trading restrictions) by expropriating more and hiding their misdemeanor. This leads to greater 
information asymmetry and thus more trading by informed outsiders. We hypothesize that although 
insider trading restrictions reduce trading by controlling shareholders, the indirect effect these restrictions 
have on increasing trading by informed market professionals is greater when the control enjoyed by the 
large shareholder is higher, and weaker when legal protection of minority shareholders is strong.
5 
To highlight the importance of minority protection in our argument, we provide a scenario (depicted 
on Fig. 1b) which compares country A, described earlier as having weak investor protection laws and 
weak insider trading regulation, with country C, where investor protection and insider trading laws are 
both strict. Since country C has higher costs of expropriation, in addition to higher costs of insider 
trading, the controlling shareholder chooses lower amounts of both activities, xC < xA and yC < yA. Thus, 
our earlier argument that insiders banned from trading resort to relatively less costly expropriation is not 
applicable to country C.  Moreover, since expropriation is lower in country C, the notion that insiders 
with high control manipulate financial statements, foster greater information asymmetry and thereby 
                                                 
4 In a related paper, Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) find that analysts are more likely to follow firms in 
countries with better enforcement of insider trading restrictions. 
5 We have hypothesized that when strict insider trading restrictions are imposed, covert expropriation by controlling 
shareholders increases information asymmetry and thus the incentives of the market professional to trade. It could be 
argued that the same information asymmetry also has a positive effect on an insider's own marginal benefit of 
trading. For the purpose of this paper, it does not matter whether informed outsiders, insiders or both increase their 
trading activity in response to the higher information asymmetry. As long as some group is trading on non-public 
information, the uninformed shareholders will suffer.    7
encourage market professionals to trade is less relevant than in country A. Therefore, in country C, where 
insider trading restrictions are accompanied by strong investor protection laws, we do not expect to see 
the aforementioned positive association between insider trading restrictions and private information 
trading conditional on high control rights.
6 
To summarize the discussions above, we expect that, 
(i)  Insider trading restrictions reduce private information trading by insiders. 
(ii)  Insider trading restrictions increase information-based trading by informed outsiders when control 
rights of the insider are high and investor protection is poor. That is, insider trading restrictions are less 
effective in reducing private information trading in the presence of concentrated control and poor investor 
protection. 
(iii)  In the presence of insider trading restrictions, insiders are more actively engaged in masking firm’s 
performance, particularly when their control rights are high. 
3. Sample and variables 
This section describes our sample construction, defines the main variables, and outlines the empirical 
methodology. 
The initial sample consists of 2,980 firms from 9 East Asian countries and 5,232 firms from 13 
Western European countries. The data, taken from Claessens et al. (2002) for East Asian companies, and 
from Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western European companies, contain control and cash rights of the 
largest shareholder. All data for the East Asian firms and most of the data for the Western European firms 
(67%) are for 1996. The rest of the data span years from 1997 to 1999. We exclude financial firms 
because accounting data for these firms are not comparable with the rest of the sample.  
3.1. Variables 
To test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, we construct the following measures:  the 
amount of private information trading, control concentration, and earnings opacity at the firm level, and 
the strictness of insider trading and investor protection regulations at the country level.  
To quantify the amount of private information trading, we use a measure developed by Llorente et al. 
(2002), which is based on stock return autocorrelation and trading volume. They consider an economy 
                                                 
6 We recognize the possibility that there may be a positive relation between the amounts of insider trading and 
expropriation. When insiders engage in expropriation of firm resources they expect firm value to suffer in the future 
because of it. This advance knowledge could encourage insiders to sell some of their holdings before firm value 
drops. That is, expropriation could create opportunities for insider trading. However, if insiders take this opportunity 
and sell, they may well attract the market’s attention and increase the probability that unlawful activities within the 
firm are detected. Insiders who expect firm value to decline because of their expropriation have to balance the 
benefit of selling stock before prices fall against the probability that the selling draws unwanted attention to their 
illegal actions. The stricter the laws against insider trading and expropriation, the less likely it is that insiders take 
advantage of the trading opportunities created by their own stealing.   8
with risk averse investors and three types of assets: a riskless bond, a risky stock, and a non-traded asset. 
The stock’s dividend, Dt = Ft + Gt, is correlated with the payoff of the non-traded asset. Since the return 
of the stock and the non-traded asset are correlated, as the holdings of the non-traded asset change, the 
investors want to adjust their stock positions to maintain an optimal risk exposure. Thus, the correlation 
between the stock and the non-traded asset creates the need for hedging trades.  
There are two groups of investors. The first group observes both components of the stock’s dividend, 
Ft and Gt, while the second group observes only Ft. Information asymmetry between the two groups is 
captured by the variance of the second dividend component, σ
2
G. This information asymmetry gives rise 
to trading on private information. Llorente et al. argue that when a subset of investors sells a stock for 
hedging reasons, the stock’s price must decrease to attract other investors to buy. Since the expectation of 
future stock payoff remains the same, the decrease in the price causes a low return in the current period 
and a high expected return for the next period. When a subset of investors sells a stock on private 
information, the stock price decreases, reflecting the negative private information about its future payoff. 
Since this information is usually partially impounded into the price, the low return in the current period is 
followed by a low return in the next period, when the negative private information is further reflected in 
price.  
The authors argue that during periods of intense trading volume, hedging trades generate negatively 
autocorrelated returns, and private information trades generate positively autocorrelated returns.  Their 
model suggests the following relation between returns and trading volume,  
t i t i t i t i t i t i V R C R C V R R E , , 2 , 1 , , 1 , ] , | [ + = + ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                     (1) 
where Ri,t is the return for company i in period t, and Vi,t is trading volume. They argue that C2 is positive 
when trading on private information dominates stock i and negative when hedging trades dominate.  
We define the amount of private information trading, PRIVATE, as the coefficient C2 in the time-
series regression,  
c
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run for each firm i in country c using at least 30 days of trading data from January 2
nd, 1997 through 
December 29
th, 2000.
7 In (2), A is the intercept, C1, C2 are the regression coefficients, and ε is the error 
term.  
                                                 
7 We choose a forward-looking time period (relative to control concentration measure) to mitigate the endogeneity 
of ownership structure. We deliberately calculate PRIVATE around the Asian financial crisis in 1998 because this is 
the period when the controlling shareholders of Asian corporations actively engaged in diversion (Johnson et al. 
(2000b)). However, our main findings do not change if we compute PRIVATE using a later period, e.g., from 1999 
to 2001.   9
Llorente et al. argue that C2 in (2) increases as more information becomes available to insiders and 
less information is left for the general public. Since we are interested in examining how insider trading 
regulation affects trading on information not available to the general public, this measure is appropriate 
for our tests. Llorente et. al. verify that C2 is positive (negative) for companies that are more (less) likely 
to suffer from information asymmetry – that is, firms with high (low) bid-ask spread, small (large) size, 
fewer (more) analysts following – indicating the dominance of private information (hedging) trades. In a 
supportive study, Grishchenko, Litov, and Mei (2003) show that C2 is, on average, larger for firms that 
are located in countries where information asymmetry problems are more severe, such as countries with 
poor disclosure requirements or countries that score low on corporate governance characteristics. 
Return Ri,t is defined as, 
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where Pi,t is the daily closing price, and Di,t is dividends per share. Trading volume, Vi,t, is calculated as 
de-trended volume, 
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where VOL is the number of shares traded, and N is the number of shares outstanding. We obtain daily 
closing prices, numbers of shares traded, and the number of shares outstanding from Datastream, and 
dividends per share from Worldscope.
  
The proxy for PRIVATE, C2, can be contaminated by several data and econometric specification 
problems. In the robustness section, we address several of them, such as autocorrelated errors, differences 
in the measurement period, and the effect of firm-specific private information versus market-wide 
information. 
We match ownership data with PRIVATE by company name. We manually check the sample of firms 
to track name changes due to mergers, restructuring, or bankruptcies. The remaining set of unmatched 
firms (less than 1% of the sample) is dropped. We exclude Ireland because it is represented by only two 
firms.  The final private information trading sample contains 2,827 firms from 21 countries.  
The measure of earnings opacity is based on Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2002) and Bhattacharya, 
Daouk, and Welker (2003). Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki show that insiders, in an effort to protect their 
private control benefits, use earnings  management to mask firm performance from outsiders. They 
propose various measures of earnings management, such as smoothing of reported operating earnings 
using accruals, the magnitude of accruals, small loss avoidance, and the correlation of accounting and   10
operating cash flows. Since our study requires an earnings opacity measure at the firm-level and because 
of data restrictions, we choose the last measure, the correlation of accounting and operating cash flows.  
For every firm, we calculate earnings opacity, OPACITY, as -1 times the Spearman correlation 
between  the changes in accruals and the changes in cash flow from operations, both scaled by lagged 
total assets. Accruals are defined as 
ACCRUALS
c
i,t = (∆CA
 c
i,t – ∆CASH
c
i,t) – (∆CL
c
i,t – ∆STD
c
i,t – ∆TP
c
i,t) - DEP
c
i,t ,                                                                            (5) 
where ∆ stands for changes, CA is total current assets, CASH is cash and cash equivalents, CL is current 
liabilities, STD is short-term debt included in current liabilities, TP is income tax payable, and DEP is 
depreciation and amortization expense. Operating cash flows are determined by first calculating the 
accruals component of earnings and then subtracting it from earnings. The data period is from 1996 
through 2001; thus each correlation coefficient is based on five data points. Large positive values for 
OPACITY indicate more earnings opacity.  
The intuition behind this measure is as follows. Insiders can use their discretion to report accounting 
accruals that offset economic shocks to the firm’s operating cash flow that would otherwise affect 
reported earnings. Depending on specific circumstances, either a positive or a negative cash flow shock 
can be viewed as undesirable by insiders who want to conceal the firm’s actual performance. If 
discretionary accounting accruals are used to buffer “undesirable” cash flow, shocks result in a large 
negative correlation (positive values of OPACITY in our case) between accruals and operating cash flows. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, however, acknowledge that just demonstrating negative correlation between 
changes in accruals and changes in operating cash flow is not sufficient evidence of smoothing because 
the negative correlation is a natural outcome of what accounting accruals actually are. However, they 
argue that higher negative magnitudes of correlation are indicative of more earnings opacity. 
The earnings opacity measure is constructed using accounting data from Worldscope. We match firm 
earnings opacity with the ownership data, drop unmatched companies, and manually inspect the 
remaining set of firms. We drop Portugal because it is represented by one firm. Our final earnings opacity 
sample consists of 2,191 firms from 21 countries. All financial and accounting variables are measured in 
U.S. dollars. 
For the concentration of control, CONT, we use data from Claessens et al. (2002) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002) described above. Their data distinguish between control and cash flow rights by using 
information on firms’ pyramid structures, cross-holdings, and dual-class shares and track the ultimate 
owner of a firm. A 10% cutoff point is used to determine whether the largest shareholder has effective 
control over intermediate and final corporations in the chain of control.  
Beny (2002, 2003) constructs an index of insider trading regulation by aggregating individual 
components of countries’ insider trading laws. The index is formed by adding one if (1) violation of the   11
insider trading law is a criminal offense; (2) tippees are prohibited from trading on material non-public 
information;
8 (3) insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders about material non-public information 
and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; (4) monetary penalties are 
proportional to insiders’ trading profits; (5) investors have a private right of action. We use this index as a 
measure of insider trading regulation, INS_REG.
9  
To construct a proxy for the enforcement of insider trading laws, we rely on country statistics 
collected by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who document the year in which each country first enforced 
its insider trading laws by prosecuting a violator. Since our explanatory variables are measured in 1996, 
we define enforcement of insider trading laws, INS_ENF, as a dummy variable, which equals one if a 
country enforced insider trading laws at least once before or during 1996, and zero otherwise. In our 
regressions, we use INS_REG and INS_ENF separately as well as their product, which we call INS. 
  The insider trading laws enforcement variable can be a noisy measure because the lack of 
prosecution prior to 1996 could indicate that trading restrictions were strict enough to deter people from 
violating them. Thus, as a robustness check, we use the rule of law index (a measure of the law and order 
tradition of the country) as a proxy for INS_ENF. Using this variable as a proxy for enforcement does not 
change our results. 
The relation between ownership structure and private information trading can be driven by many 
factors. In our regressions we control for variables that can affect both ownership structure and the 
incidence of private information trading.  
La Porta et al. (1998b) show that both cash flow rights and control rights are more concentrated in 
countries with a poor legal environment. According to Grishchenko, Litov, and Mei (2003), there is more 
trading based on private information in countries with a poor legal environment. In our regressions we 
control for this by including the efficiency of the judicial system, JUDIC, defined in La Porta et al. 
(1998a).  
By construction, control rights and cash flow rights are correlated in our sample. Moreover, Beny 
(2003) shows that a greater cash flow ownership stake reduces the insider’s incentives to trade on private 
information. Thus we control for cash flow ownership, CASH, obtained from Claessens et al. (2002) and 
Faccio and Lang (2002).  
                                                 
8 Tippees are individuals who receive information from insiders. 
9 The index does not capture laws that require insiders to disclose their trades as, for example, in the U.S. However, 
it is likely that countries that score high on INS_REG also tend to have stricter insider trading disclosure laws. In 
countries where public disclosure of trades is required, PRIVATE  is expected to be lower because (i) insider 
information becomes incorporated in stock prices more quickly, and (ii) insiders may trade less, so as not to release 
their information and that, again, lowers PRIVATE.   12
Coefficient C2 in (2) can be influenced by liquidity. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that the less 
liquid a stock is, the larger is the price impact of trades and the more negative C2 is. On the other hand, 
using firm size as a measure of liquidity, Llorente et al. indicate that C2 is negatively related to firm size. 
Moreover, according to Maug (2000), insider trading restrictions are most valuable when stock markets 
are sufficiently liquid because insider trading is more likely to occur in liquid markets. Finally, stocks of 
firms with lower ownership concentrations tend to be more liquid. For these reasons we include the log of 
market capitalization in 1996, MV, to control for liquidity. Our results remain unchanged if we proxy for 
liquidity by firm size defined as the log of total assets. 
Coefficient C2 can be estimated with greater precision for firms with more time-series observations. 
To control for this heterogeneity we include the log of the number of trading periods, LNN, as a control 
parameter. 
Industry dummies, D, are included in regressions to account for differences in asset structure, 
accounting practices, government regulation, and competitiveness, all of which may affect ownership 
structure and the incentive to pursue private information trading. We classify two-digit SIC industries into 
12 groups as in Campbell (1996).  
Controlling shareholders of firms with greater growth opportunities and a higher fraction of 
intangible assets may have more opportunities to trade on private information. Therefore, we control for 
firms’ investment opportunities, INV_OPP, defined as growth in sales, and R&D expenditures over sales, 
R&D. These variables are calculated for 1996. Finally, we control for time dummies, T, because our 
ownership data come from different years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.  
To capture investor protection laws and their enforcement, we define the variable PROT as the 
product of anti-director index, taken from La Porta, et al. (1998a), and the rule of law.  As a robustness 
check, we use the legality index, as in Durnev and Kim (2003), instead of investor protection variable. 
The legality index is constructed by combining investor and creditor protections, the efficiency of the 
judicial system, rule of law, absence of corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation 
(see La Porta et al. (1998a) for definitions of these variables and Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) 
for the methodology of creating the legality index). The main results remain unchanged. 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) document that firms that issue ADRs receive higher valuation. 
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) suggest that cross listing enhances firm value through its effect on the 
firm’s information environment. Jain (2003) shows that electronic trading, compared to floor trading, 
enhances liquidity and informativeness of stock markets. We do not control for ADRs or electronic 
trading because our sample includes only non-ADR stocks from exchanges with electronic trading 
systems.    13
The description of all variables and data sources appears in Table I. 
3.2. Empirical setup  
Our multivariate regressions are of the form,  
c
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=1
, 2 1 ,                                               (6) 
where i indexes firms, c indexes countries, PRIVATE is the measure of private information trading; CONT 
is control concentration; INS is a measure of the strictness of insider trading laws, CONT×INS is the 
interaction term of control concentration with a measure of the strictness of insider trading laws; and Z’s 
are control variables.  
We first estimate equation (6) for the entire sample. We predict that stricter insider trading laws are 
associated with less private information trading (β2 < 0), and that insider trading laws are less effective in 
reducing private information trading for firms with high-control concentration (γ > 0). Next, we estimate 
the same equation for strong- and weak- investor protection subsamples. If insider trading restrictions 
become less effective in the presence of high control rights because controlling shareholders resort to 
other forms of expropriation, we expect the coefficient γ to be significant only in countries where the cost 
of expropriation is low, i.e., in the poor investor protection subsample. Finally, we use earnings opacity as 
the dependent variable in regression (6) to test whether controlling shareholders have greater incentive to 
engage in earnings opacity in the presence of insider trading restrictions. 
We estimate these regressions using country-random effects to take into account the possibility that 
observations on individual firms in a given country can be correlated. For example, C2 estimates may not 
be independent if the error terms in (2) are correlated across stocks.  We check the validity of country-
random effects specification with the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test. In almost all specifications, the test 
rejects the hypothesis that the variation of random effects is zero. By construction, CONT and INS are 
highly correlated with the interaction term, CONT×INS. Following Jaccard and Turissi (2003), we center 
the above variables (subtract the corresponding sample means from each observation) to reduce 
multicollinearity. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Univariate results 
Table II reports summary statistics, by country, for the primary variables. There is great variation in 
the average amount of private information trading. It is the highest in Philippines (PRIVATE = 0.044), 
Italy (0.041), and Portugal (0.032) and the lowest in South Korea (-0.040), Malaysia (-0.036), and Hong    14
Kong (-0.027). Countries also differ substantially in the degree of insider trading regulation. Norway (INS 
= 1), Indonesia (2), and Philippines (0) have relatively lax insider trading laws, while South Korea (5), 
Taiwan (4), and France (4) have strict laws with at least one case of prosecution before or during 1996. 
Table III reports correlation coefficients. The coefficients indicate that the amount of private 
information trading is larger for firms with greater concentration of control and lower for firms with more 
liquid stocks and for firms located in countries with stricter insider trading laws. Moreover, companies 
with greater private information trading have more opaque earnings. Given that our measure of private 
information trading is positively correlated with information asymmetry, the observed relation between 
private information trading and earnings opacity is consistent with Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker’s 
(2003) result that earnings management is associated with greater information asymmetry and higher cost 
of capital.  
In Figure 2a, we plot the average amount of private information trading, PRIVATE, against INS, the 
strictness of insider trading laws. The plot suggests a monotonically decreasing relation between private 
information trading and strictness of insider trading regulation. This result is consistent with Grishchenko, 
Litov, Mei (2003), who document that private information trading is prevalent in countries with lax 
insider trading enforcement. This suggests that a decline in trading by informed insiders offsets any 
increased activity of the market professionals. However, these graphs do not capture the interaction of 
control rights and insider trading restrictions, which we believe is an important determinant of trading by 
market professionals.  
In Figure 2b, we plot the average amount of information based trading, PRIVATE, against CONT, the 
control rights of the largest shareholder. The graph indicates that, with the exception of the 10-20% 
control level, higher control rights of the largest shareholder are associated with greater trading on private 
information. The non-monotonic relation points to the need to control for other factors before drawing 
inference about the relation between private-information trading and control rights. For this we turn to 
multivariate tests.  
4.2. Multivariate tests 
Specification 4.1 in Table IV presents the results of a simple OLS regression of private information 
trading on control concentration and strictness of insider trading laws, controlling for cash flow rights. 
Higher control concentration is associated with more private information trading, and stricter insider 
trading laws are associated with less private information trading. This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
country random-effects, a liquidity measure, log of the number of trading periods, industry dummies and 
time dummies (Specification 4.2).  
Specification 4.3 includes the explanatory variable we are particularly interested in – the interaction 
term of control concentration with the strictness of insider trading laws. In this specification, we also find   15
that higher control rights of the largest shareholder are associated with higher private information trading. 
This finding seems consistent with the idea that (i) greater control of the firm’s operations gives 
shareholders access to information which they use to obtain trading profits for themselves; and (ii) 
controlling shareholders prefer opacity with respect to the firm’s financial performance, creating 
information asymmetry and thus increasing the opportunities for private information-based trading.  
Specification 4.3 also shows that stricter insider trading regulation is associated with less private 
information trading. However, the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of control 
concentration with insider trading regulation indicates that insider trading regulation is less effective in 
reducing private information trading when control rights of the largest shareholder are higher.   
To interpret these finding, we recall that there are two groups who can engage in private information 
trading – controlling shareholders and market professionals. Insider trading restrictions reduce the 
incentives of controlling shareholders to trade. This lower incentive is reflected in the significantly 
negative coefficient on INS. However, as we have argued, insider trading restrictions increase the 
incentives of informed outsiders to trade, particularly in the presence of high control rights. The positive 
and significant coefficient on the interaction of INS and CONT provides evidence in support of our 
argument.  
These results continue to hold when we control for efficiency of the judicial system, firm investment 
opportunities and R&D expenditures (Specification 4.4). Consistent with prior studies, more liquid stocks 
experience significantly lower private information trading (see Llorente et al. (2002), Grischenko, Mei, 
and Litov (2003)). 
Based on specification 4.3 in Table IV, the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that when insider 
trading laws improve by one point (out of five), the amount of private information trading decreases by 
0.0104, for the mean value of control concentration. However, for firms with the lowest control in our 
sample, zero percent (1
st percentile), the amount of private information trading decreases by 0.0159, while 
it actually increases by 0.0048 for firms with 90 percent (99
th percentile) control. This confirms our 
hypothesis that although stricter insider trading regulation reduces private information trading, the laws 
become less effective for high-control companies. 
Although the results presented above support our arguments, we test whether our interpretation of the 
results is justified. We claim that controlling shareholders banned from trading can make up for lost 
profits by expropriating resources from the firm, provided they have sufficient control. Individuals   
involved in diverting firms’ resources will attempt to mask the resulting poor performance of the firm, 
foster information asymmetry and thus, indirectly encourage trading by market professionals. The 
increased activity of market professionals in the presence of insider trading restrictions and high control   16
rights manifests itself in the positive coefficient on the interaction of control rights and insider trading 
restrictions. 
If our interpretation is correct, the interaction of control rights with insider trading restrictions should 
be associated with higher private information trading only in countries where insiders find it relatively 
easy to resort to expropriation, that is, in countries with poor investor protection. Moreover, if the 
controlling shareholder hides evidence of expropriation, we expect greater earnings opacity when strict 
insider trading restrictions are imposed on firms with more concentrated control. We test the validity of 
our conjecture by splitting the sample into low- and high-investor protection countries and running our 
regressions for each subsample.
10 The results are presented in Table V. Panel A (low-investor protection 
subsample) shows that the coefficient on insider trading restrictions is significantly negative, but the 
coefficient on the interaction of insider trading with control rights is significantly positive. This suggests 
that insider trading regulation is less effective in reducing private information trading when control rights 
are high. In contrast, in Panel B (high-investor protection subsample) the coefficient on insider trading 
restrictions is still negative and significant, but the interaction term is now insignificant. This implies that 
in countries where shareholder rights are well protected, insider trading regulation unambiguously 
reduces private information trading, but in countries where minority shareholder rights are not protected, 
private information trading may remain unchanged and even increase in the presence of insider trading 
restrictions.  
It can be argued that our results are driven by the possibility that countries with high-investor 
protection standards are also the ones that enforce insider trading laws. That is, insider trading laws are 
more effective in countries with high-investor protection standards simply because these countries happen 
to be the ones that also enforce the existing insider trading rules. However, this alternative argument 
cannot explain away our findings because the coefficient on INS is negative and significant in both the 
high- and low-investor protection subsamples. This suggests that even in low-investor protection 
countries, the enforcement of insider trading regulation is sufficient to put a downward pressure on 
private information trading. 
To investigate whether the quality of information provided to the public is actually lower when strict 
insider trading restrictions are imposed on firms with more concentrated control, we use the earnings 
opacity measure, OPACITY, as the dependent variable in (6). Panel C of Table V indicates that firms with 
high-control concentration have more opaque earnings. More importantly, consistent with our hypotheses, 
high control concentration is associated with even greater opacity in countries with stricter insider trading 
                                                 
10 The low- (high-) investor protection subsample consists of firms with investor protection score, PROT, lower 
(higher) than the sample median of 33.3.   17
laws. The result indicates that the controlling shareholders mask firm performance by manipulating 
financial statements in countries with strict insider trading regulation. 
4.3. Robustness 
Our results are robust to checks on endogeneity, regression specification, definition of main variables, 
and outliers. That is, the regression coefficients generate very similar patterns of signs and statistical 
significance to those reported in Tables IV-VII. 
The coefficients reported above can be biased because of endogeneity. Endogeneity could arise due to 
unobserved variables that are correlated with both ownership structure and the amount of private 
information trading. It may also arise due to a reverse causality between control rights and private 
information trading. For example, in countries where higher profits can be obtained through private 
information trading, shareholders may choose to acquire greater control in order to have privileged access 
to nonpublic information.  We address these potential endogeneity issues by using legal origin dummies, 
ORIGIN, defined in La Porta et al. (1998a), as instruments for the ownership variables. La Porta et al. 
(1998b)  show that legal origin shapes firms' ownership structure. However, there is no a priori reason to 
believe that legal origin affects the amount of private information trading, other than through ownership 
structure and the variables we already control for.  
Table VI repeats the regressions of Table IV using legal origin dummies as instruments for CONT, 
CASH, and CONT×INS, which are assumed to be endogenous. It is evident from the instrumental variable 
regressions that the results described earlier still hold, and become even stronger.
11 Greater control 
concentration is associated with more private information trading. Insider trading regulation reduces 
information trading, but is less successful in doing so when control rights of the largest shareholder are 
higher.  
An interesting difference in the results of this specification is that the coefficient on cash flow rights 
is significantly negative, suggesting that when the largest shareholder has more cash flow rights, private 
information trading is lower. This is consistent with the view that when cash flow rights are high, the 
return to large shareholders of monitoring the firm’s operations is high, thus reducing their incentive to 
trade personally on nonpublic information or to create an opaque environment that fosters private 
information trading by other informed individuals. 
Next, we demonstrate robustness to various factors that can affect our measure of private information 
trading. We define PRIVATE as the coefficient C2 in the time-series regression in (2). First, since the 
estimated coefficient can be affected by autocorrelated errors, we repeat the regressions using an 
appropriate autoregressive structure, based on Breusch (1978) test. Second, it is likely that private 
                                                 
11 At the bottom of Table VI we report the results of Durbin-Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity. The test indicates 
that ownership variables are endogenous.    18
information  trading is affected more by information about firm-specific factors rather than information 
about market-wide factors. Therefore, we re-estimate (2) after deducting local stock markets’ factors from 
returns and volume. Third, we estimate C2 for only those stocks that have at least 300 daily return-volume 
observations. When we repeat the regressions in Tables IV and V with the new measures of PRIVATE, 
the results remain qualitatively unchanged in all cases. We do not report them to save space.     
In our main specification, strictness of insider trading laws is measured by the product of the insider 
trading index, INS_REG, and the insider trading law enforcement dummy variable, INS_ENF. Since 
previous studies (Beny (2002) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)) used either the insider trading index 
or the insider trading enforcement variable, we check the robustness of our findings by including 
INS_REG and INS_ENF and their interaction terms with CONT separately. The results are presented in 
Table VII. The coefficient on INS_REG is significantly negative suggesting that stricter insider trading 
regulation is associated with lower private information trading. The coefficient on INS_ENF is negative 
but not significant. However, the coefficients on the interaction terms of INS_REG and INS_ENF  with 
control rights are both positive and significant. These findings continue to suggest that when the control 
rights of  large shareholders are higher, both insider trading regulation and its enforcement are less 
effective at reducing private information trading. 
Our results also hold if we repeat the analyses after dropping Japanese firms on the grounds that they 
comprise 29% of the sample. Finally, our findings are not affected if we winsorize all variables at the 1% 
and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the past decade, most stock markets around the world have introduced rules against insider trading. 
In many countries, these rules have been enforced with the prosecution of those violating the laws. The 
objective of insider trading restrictions is purportedly to improve the integrity and liquidity of stock 
markets by encouraging ordinary investors to participate. Insider trading restrictions are intended to 
reduce the adverse selection problem facing uninformed investors by limiting the incidence of private 
information trading.   
This paper examines the effectiveness of insider trading restrictions in reducing private information 
trading. The empirical results indicate that in a world where both insiders and market professionals can 
trade on private information, insider trading restrictions become less effective if control rights of the 
largest shareholder are high and investor protection standards are weak. We hypothesize that controlling 
shareholders banned from insider trading may be able to make up for the loss in trading profits by 
expropriating the firm’s resources if the protection given to minority shareholders against such 
expropriation is low. The opaque informational environment that often accompanies covert activities of   19
controlling shareholders can, in turn, increase the information acquisition and trading activity of market 
professionals who trade at the expense of uninformed investors.  
Using a sample of 2,827 firms from 21 countries, we find that when investor protection standards are 
high, insider trading restrictions unambiguously reduce the amount of private information trading. 
However, when investor protection is weak, concentrated control rights make insider trading restrictions 
less effective in reducing private information trading. In fact, for very high levels of control, insider 
trading restrictions may actually increase trading on private information. We also find that firms with 
concentrated control have more opaque earnings, especially in countries with stricter insider trading 
regulation. This suggests that controlling shareholders have more to hide when they are banned from 
trading and supports our conjecture that controlling shareholders expropriate more in the presence of 
stricter insider trading laws.   
Taken together, if a primary purpose of insider trading restrictions is to minimize losses of 
uninformed investors and restore their confidence in financial markets, the results above provide evidence 
that insider trading restrictions may become counterproductive when investor protection is poor and 
control rights are concentrated. Rather, insider trading restrictions may simply transfer trading profits 
from insiders to informed market professionals leaving uninformed investors no better-off than before. 
Since insider trading restrictions take time, effort and money to introduce and enforce, we suggest that if a 
regulator decides to introduce them in a country where control rights are concentrated, she should ensure 
that the investor protection standards are also high. Otherwise, the regulator will be paying all the costs of 
imposing the restrictions without necessarily seeing the benefits. 
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 Figure 1a: Insider Trading – Diversion Choice for an Insider when the Cost of Insider 
Trading Increases. This graph depicts an insider’s indifference curves, insider trading-diversion cost constraints 
and the trading-diversion trade-off for a firm located in a country with low costs of insider trading and diversion 
(country A) and with high cost of insider trading and low cost of diversion (country B). The slopes of the straight 
lines M1M2 and M1M3 (cost constraints) are equal to the cost of insider trading relative to the cost of diversion. In 
country A, the insider chooses an amount of insider trading equal to xA and an amount of funds diverted equal to yA. 
In country B, the insider chooses lower amount of insider trading xB < xA and higher amount of diversion yB > yA. 
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yBFigure 1b: Insider Trading – Diversion Choice for an Insider when Both Costs of Insider 
Trading and Diversion Increase. This graph depicts an insider’s indifference curves, insider trading-diversion 
cost constraints and the trading-diversion trade-off for a firm located in a country with low costs of insider trading and 
diversion (country A) and with high costs of insider trading and diversion (country C). The slopes of the straight lines 
M1M2, M1M3 and M4M3 (cost constraints) are equal to the cost of insider trading relative to the cost of diversion. In 
country A, the insider chooses an amount of insider trading equal to xA and an amount of funds diverted equal to yA. In 
country C, the insider chooses lower amounts of insider trading xC < xA and diversion yC < yA. 
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u
r
c
e
s
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
T
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
,
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
,
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
C
2
 
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
c
t
i
c
c
t
i
c
i
c
t
i
c
i
c
i
c
t
i
t
i
V
R
C
R
C
A
R
,
,
2
,
,
1
,
1
,
,
ε
+
+
+
=
+
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
i
 
i
n
d
e
x
e
s
 
f
i
r
m
s
,
 
t
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
c
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
;
 
A
 
i
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
e
p
t
,
 
C
1
,
 
C
2
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
ε
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
t
e
r
m
.
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
)
/
)
l
o
g
(
(
1
,
,
,
,
−
+
=
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
P
D
P
R
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
P
 
i
s
 
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
D
 
a
r
e
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
 
p
e
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
.
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
,
 
V
,
 
i
s
 
d
e
-
t
r
e
n
d
e
d
 
v
o
l
u
m
e
,
 
∑
=
−
−
−
=
2
0
1
1
,
,
,
,
,
)
/
l
o
g
(
2
0
/
1
)
/
l
o
g
(
j
t
i
j
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
N
V
O
L
N
V
O
L
V
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
V
O
L
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
N
 
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
o
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
r
u
n
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
2
,
 
1
9
9
7
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
9
,
 
2
0
0
0
.
 
W
e
 
d
r
o
p
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
 
f
e
w
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
3
0
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
d
a
y
s
.
 
H
i
g
h
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
m
e
a
n
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
.
 
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
f
o
r
 
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
,
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
o
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
,
 
a
n
d
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
s
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
C
O
N
T
 
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
h
e
l
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
’
 
p
y
r
a
m
i
d
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
d
u
a
l
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
.
 
T
o
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
a
 
1
0
%
 
c
u
t
o
f
f
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
i
s
 
u
s
e
d
,
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
h
a
s
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
6
 
f
o
r
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
A
s
i
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
,
 
U
.
K
.
;
 
1
9
9
7
 
f
o
r
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
;
 
1
9
9
8
 
f
o
r
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
,
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
;
 
1
9
9
9
 
f
o
r
 
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
.
 
C
l
a
e
s
s
e
n
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
 
f
o
r
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
A
s
i
a
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
F
a
c
c
i
o
 
a
n
d
 
L
a
n
g
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
f
o
r
 
W
e
s
t
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
I
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
N
S
_
R
E
G
 
A
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
’
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
d
d
i
n
g
 
1
 
i
f
:
 
(
1
)
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
 
i
s
 
a
 
c
r
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
o
f
f
e
n
s
e
;
 
(
2
)
 
t
i
p
p
e
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
n
o
n
-
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
(
3
)
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
r
o
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
i
p
p
i
n
g
 
o
u
t
s
i
d
e
r
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
n
o
n
-
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
m
 
t
o
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
o
n
 
s
u
c
h
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
 
g
a
i
n
;
 
(
4
)
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
p
e
n
a
l
t
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
o
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
’
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
;
 
(
5
)
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
r
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
S
c
a
l
e
:
 
0
 
-
 
5
.
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
s
c
o
r
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
B
e
n
y
 
(
2
0
0
2
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
3
)
.
 
 
 
I
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
I
N
S
_
E
N
F
 
A
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
i
f
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
(
i
.
e
.
,
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
o
n
c
e
)
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
 
 
B
h
a
t
t
a
c
h
a
r
y
a
 
a
n
d
 
D
a
o
u
k
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
.
 
 
 
S
t
r
i
c
t
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
 
I
N
S
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
o
f
 
I
N
S
_
R
E
G
 
a
n
d
 
I
N
S
_
E
N
F
.
 
S
c
a
l
e
:
 
0
 
-
 
5
.
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
s
c
o
r
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
l
a
w
s
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
.
 
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
O
p
a
c
i
t
y
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
o
p
a
c
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
a
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
s
m
o
o
t
h
i
n
g
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
i
a
l
 
m
o
t
i
v
e
s
.
 
F
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
f
i
r
m
 
,
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
-
1
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
S
p
e
a
r
m
a
n
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
,
 
b
o
t
h
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
 
I
t
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
9
7
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
2
0
0
1
.
 
A
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
(
5
)
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
x
t
.
 
H
i
g
h
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
o
p
a
c
i
t
y
.
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
.
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
 
 
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
J
U
D
I
C
 
A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
s
 
i
t
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
.
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
8
0
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
1
9
8
3
.
 
S
c
a
l
e
:
 
0
 
-
 
1
0
.
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
s
c
o
r
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
a
)
.
 
 
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
 I
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
P
R
O
T
 
T
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
.
 
I
t
 
i
s
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
d
d
i
n
g
 
1
 
w
h
e
n
:
 
(
1
)
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
l
l
o
w
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
m
a
i
l
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
v
o
t
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
;
 
(
2
)
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
;
 
(
3
)
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
v
o
t
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
o
f
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
i
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
e
d
;
 
(
4
)
 
a
n
 
o
p
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
p
l
a
c
e
;
 
(
5
)
 
t
h
e
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
n
t
i
t
l
e
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
a
l
l
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
 
E
x
t
r
a
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
 
S
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
r
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
0
%
;
 
(
6
)
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
p
r
e
e
m
p
t
i
v
e
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
b
e
 
w
a
v
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
 
v
o
t
e
.
 
S
c
a
l
e
:
 
0
-
6
.
 
T
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
I
t
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
T
h
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
0
-
6
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
t
o
 
0
-
1
0
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
a
s
 
i
n
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
a
)
.
 
H
i
g
h
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
P
R
O
T
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
a
)
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
a
n
d
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
G
u
i
d
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
.
 
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
O
R
I
G
I
N
 
L
e
g
a
l
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
l
a
w
 
o
r
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
c
o
d
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
(
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
l
a
w
,
 
F
r
e
n
c
h
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
l
a
w
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
l
a
w
,
 
a
n
d
 
S
c
a
n
d
i
n
a
v
i
a
n
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
l
a
w
)
.
 
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
8
a
)
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
 
 
 
C
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
C
A
S
H
 
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
h
e
l
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
d
i
s
t
i
n
g
u
i
s
h
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
’
 
p
y
r
a
m
i
d
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
,
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
d
u
a
l
-
c
l
a
s
s
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
1
9
9
6
 
f
o
r
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
A
s
i
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
,
 
U
.
K
.
;
 
1
9
9
7
 
f
o
r
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
;
 
1
9
9
8
 
f
o
r
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
,
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
9
 
f
o
r
 
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
.
 
C
l
a
e
s
s
e
n
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
f
o
r
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
A
s
i
a
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
F
a
c
c
i
o
 
a
n
d
 
L
a
n
g
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
f
o
r
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
L
M
V
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
.
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
o
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
.
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
L
N
N
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
r
u
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
(
2
)
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
x
t
 
t
o
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
 
 
R
I
V
A
T
E
.
 
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
.
 
F
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
 
S
I
Z
E
 
L
o
g
a
r
i
t
h
m
 
o
f
 
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
.
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
I
N
V
_
O
P
P
 
O
n
e
-
y
e
a
r
 
1
9
9
5
-
t
o
-
1
9
9
6
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
w
i
n
s
o
r
i
z
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
%
 
a
n
d
 
9
9
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
.
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
R
&
D
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
W
o
r
l
d
s
c
o
p
e
.
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
D
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
e
d
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
t
w
o
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
S
I
C
s
.
 
T
h
e
y
 
a
r
e
:
 
p
e
t
r
o
l
e
u
m
 
(
S
I
C
 
1
3
,
 
2
9
)
,
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
d
u
r
a
b
l
e
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
3
0
,
 
3
6
,
 
3
7
,
 
5
0
,
 
5
5
,
 
5
7
)
,
 
b
a
s
i
c
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
(
S
I
C
 
8
,
 
1
0
,
 
1
2
,
 
1
4
,
 
2
4
,
 
2
6
,
 
2
8
,
 
3
3
)
,
 
f
o
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
 
(
S
I
C
 
2
0
,
 
2
1
,
 
5
4
)
,
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
S
I
C
 
1
5
,
 
1
6
,
 
1
7
,
 
3
2
)
,
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
3
4
,
 
3
5
,
 
3
8
,
 
3
9
)
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
S
I
C
 
4
0
,
 
4
1
,
 
4
2
,
 
4
4
,
 
4
5
,
 
4
7
)
,
 
t
e
x
t
i
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
(
S
I
C
 
2
2
,
 
2
3
,
 
5
1
,
 
5
3
,
 
5
6
,
 
5
9
)
,
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
7
,
 
7
3
,
 
7
5
,
 
8
0
,
 
8
2
,
 
8
3
,
 
8
7
,
 
9
6
)
,
 
l
e
i
s
u
r
e
 
(
S
I
C
 
2
7
,
 
5
8
,
 
7
0
,
 
7
9
)
,
 
u
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
4
8
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
4
9
)
.
 
C
a
m
p
b
e
l
l
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
.
 
Y
e
a
r
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
T
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
1
9
9
6
,
 
1
9
9
7
,
 
1
9
9
8
,
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
9
.
 
 
 T
a
b
l
e
 
I
I
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
b
y
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
)
 
o
f
 
m
a
i
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
o
r
t
e
d
 
a
l
p
h
a
b
e
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
.
 
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
O
R
I
G
I
N
 
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
r
e
g
i
m
e
;
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
;
 
“
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
>
 
0
”
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
C
2
 
i
n
 
(
2
)
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
x
t
;
 
 
N
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
d
a
y
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
;
 
“
F
i
r
m
s
,
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
”
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
;
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
i
s
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
o
p
a
c
i
t
y
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
;
 
“
F
i
r
m
s
,
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
”
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
;
 
C
O
N
T
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
i
n
 
%
 
t
e
r
m
s
)
;
 
C
A
S
H
 
a
r
e
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
(
i
n
 
%
 
t
e
r
m
s
)
;
 
 
“
I
N
S
_
E
N
F
,
 
Y
e
a
r
”
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
 
c
a
s
e
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
;
 
I
N
S
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
;
 
M
V
 
i
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
i
n
 
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
U
.
S
.
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
.
 
F
i
r
m
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
b
e
l
o
n
g
 
t
o
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
S
I
C
 
6
0
,
 
6
1
,
 
6
2
,
 
6
3
,
 
6
5
,
 
6
7
)
 
a
r
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
 
W
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
o
p
a
c
i
t
y
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
t
h
e
y
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
t
w
o
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
R
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
I
 
f
o
r
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
O
R
I
G
I
N
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
,
 
m
e
a
n
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
>
 
0
,
 
%
 
N
 
F
i
r
m
s
,
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
,
 
M
e
a
n
 
F
i
r
m
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O
P
A
C
I
T
Y
 
C
O
N
T
 
C
A
S
H
 
I
N
S
_
R
E
G
 
I
N
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E
N
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Regressions of Amount of Private Information Trading on Control Concentration, 
Strictness of Insider Trading Laws, Interaction Term, and Control Variables 
 
 This table reports the results of country-random effects regressions (specifications 4.2-4.4): 
c
i
K
k
c
i k k
c c
i
c c
i
c
i Z INS CONT INS CONT PRIVATE ε δ γ β β α + + × + + + = ∑
=1
, 2 1
, 
where c indexes countries and i indexes firms. Variable α is a constant (coefficient is not reported), E[εi
c] = 0, E[εi
c εj
c] ≠ 0 ∀ i and j, and E is the 
expectation operator.  Specification 4.1 is based on OLS regression. In all specifications the dependent variable is PRIVATE, the amount of 
private information trading. Variable CONT is control concentration (it is centered around its mean in specifications 4.3 and 4.4); INS is the 
strictness of insider trading laws (it is centered around its mean in specifications 4.3 and 4.4); and CONT×INS is the interaction term of control 
concentration with the strictness of insider trading laws. Control variables, Z’s,  are: cash flow rights (specifications 4.1-4.4), CASH; liquidity, 
LMV (specifications 4.2-4.4); log of the number of trading periods, LNN (specifications 4.2-4.4); industry dummies, D (specifications 4.2-4.4, 
coefficients are not reported); time dummies, T (specifications 4.2-4.4, coefficients are not reported); efficiency of the judicial system, JUDIC 
(specification 4.4), investment opportunities, INV_OPP (specification 4.4; it is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels); and research and 
development expenditures, R&D (specification 4.4). All financial and accounting variables are measured in U.S. dollars. Numbers in parentheses 
are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on 
two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. We drop firms 
from the sample if their measure of private information trading is based on fewer than 30 trading days. We exclude Ireland from the private 
information trading  sample because it is represented by only two firms. If all variables, except R&D expenditures, are available we set R&D 
expenditures to zero. At the bottom of the table we report the results of the  Breusch-Pagan test that the variance of the random effects is zero. In 
specification 4.1 we report the F-statistics of overall significance instead of  Wald test statistics. Refer to Table I for definitions of variables.  
 
Dependent Variable Amount of Private Information Trading, 
PRIVATE 
Specification 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
0.0326  0.0259  0.0267  0.0255    Control concentration  CONT
(0.02)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
-0.00931  -0.0104  -0.0104    -0.0106  Strictness of insider trading 
laws 
INS
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
-  -  0.0203  0.0213  Interaction term of control 
concentration with strictness 
of insider trading laws 
CONT×INS
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
-0.00634 -0.00783 -0.00979 -0.00862  Cash flow rights  CASH
(0.66)    (0.61) (0.52) (0.57) 
-  -0.00550 -0.00542 -0.00534  Liquidity LMV
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
- 0.00453  0.00371  0.00373  Log of number of trading 
periods 
LNN
 (0.19)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
Industry dummies  D no yes yes yes 
Time dummies  T no yes yes yes 
- - -  -0.000324  Efficiency of judicial system  JUDIC
    ( 0 . 6 6 )  
- - -  -0.00751  Investment opportunities  INV_OPP
    ( 0 . 1 2 )  
- - -  0.000116  Research and development 
expenditures 
R&D
    ( 0 . 9 7 )  
33.830 164.920  180.480  184.640  Wald test statistics of overall significance
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2 0.035 0.059 0.064 0.066 
Number of firms 2,827 2,642 2,642 2,637 
-  418.430 265.310 247.790  Breusch-Pagan Test
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) Table V 
Regressions of Amount of Private Information Trading (Run for High- and Low-Investor 
Protection Sub-samples) and Earnings Opacity on Control Concentration, Strictness of Insider 
Trading Laws, Interaction Term, and Control Variables  
This table reports the results of country random-effects regressions: 
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i Z INS CONT INS CONT OPACITY PRIVATE ε δ γ β β α + + × + + + = ∑
=1
, 2 1 or    , 
where c indexes countries and i indexes firms. Variable α is a constant (coefficient is not reported), E[εj
c] = 0, E[εi
c εj
c] ≠ 0 ∀ i and j, and E is the 
expectation operator. The dependent variable is PRIVATE, the amount of private information trading (Panels A and B) or OPACITY, earnings opacity 
(Panel C). Variable CONT is control concentration (it is centered around its mean in all specifications); INS is the strictness of insider trading laws (it is 
centered around its mean in all specifications); and CONT×INS is the interaction term of control concentration with the strictness of insider trading laws. 
Control variables, Z’s,  are: cash flow rights (in all specifications), CASH; liquidity, LMV (in all specifications); log of the number of trading periods, LNN 
(specifications 5.1-5.4); industry dummies, D  (in all specifications, coefficients are not reported); time dummies, T (in all specifications, coefficients are 
not reported); efficiency of the judicial system, JUDIC (specifications 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6), investment opportunities, INV_OPP (specifications 5.2, 5.4, and 
5.6; it is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels); and research and development expenditures, R&D (specifications 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6). All financial and 
accounting variables are measured in U.S. dollars. In Panel A, the sample consists of firms from low-investor protection countries (PROT ≤ 33.3 (sample 
median)). In Panel B, the sample consists of firms from high-investor protection countries (PROT > 33.3 (sample median)). Numbers in parentheses are 
probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on two-tailed 
test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. We drop firms from the sample if 
they their measure of private information trading is based on fewer than 30 trading days. We exclude Ireland from the private information trading sample 
and Portugal from the earnings opacity sample because they are represented by only two and one firms, respectively. If all variables, except R&D 
expenditures, are available we set R&D expenditures to zero. At the bottom of the table we report the results if the  Breusch-Pagan test that the variance of 
the random effects is zero. Refer to Table I for definitions of variables.  
 
Dependent Variable  Amount of Private Information Trading, 
PRIVATE 
Earnings Opacity, 
OPACITY 
Sample  Panel A: Low investor 
protection subsample, 
PROT ≤ 33.3 (sample 
median) 
Panel B: High investor 
protection subsample, 
PROT > 33.3 (sample 
median) 
 
 
 
Panel C 
Specification  5.1 5.2 5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6 
0.0189  0.01505  0.000787  -0.000293  0.139  0.132  Control rights  CONT 
(0.25)  (0.36)  (0.98)  (0.99)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
-0.0108  -0.0104    -0.0135  -0.00904  0.00880   0.00822  Strictness of insider 
trading laws 
INS 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.30)  (0.35) 
0.0237  0.0190  -0.00662  -0.00855  0.0473  0.0488  Interaction term of 
control concentration 
with strictness of 
insider trading laws 
CONT×INS 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.10)    (0.09)  
-0.00265   -0.00271  -0.0263 -0.0104  -0.108  -0.0947  Cash flow rights  CASH 
(0.25) (0.87) (0.39)  (0.73)  (0.23)    (0.29) 
-0.00485 -0.00499 -0.00543  -0.00517 0.0101  0.00899  Liquidity LMV 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.04) 
-0.00891 -0.0144 0.00937  0.00958  - -  Log of number of 
trading periods 
LNN 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.10)  (0.09)     
Industry dummies  D  yes  yes  yes yes yes  yes 
Time dummies  T  yes  yes  yes yes yes  yes 
Efficiency of judicial 
system 
JUDIC  -  0.00177  -  0.0317  - 0.00663 
     (0.07)   (0.00)   (0.18) 
Investment 
opportunities 
INV_OPP  -  0.0164  -  -0.0288  - -0.0236 
     (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.44) 
Research and 
development 
expenditures 
R&D  - -0.0113 -  0.00139  -  0.00052
8 
    (0.23)   (0.71)   (0.98)   
246.260  208.330  68.200 104.050 37.980  41.230  Wald test statistics of overall significance 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.137  0.150  0.046 0.069 0.018  0.019 
Number of firms  1,210  1,206  1,432 1,431 2,155  2,151 
224.030 162.480  42.250 10.060 32.560  24.920  Breusch-Pagan Test 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
 Table VI 
Two-stage Least Squares Regressions of Amount of Private Information Trading on 
Control Concentration, Strictness of Insider Trading Laws, and Control Variables with 
Legal Origin Dummies as Instruments for Ownership Variables 
 
 This table reports the results of the following two-stage least squares regression: 
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i Z INS CONT INS CONT PRIVATE ε δ γ β β α + + × + + + = ∑
=1
, 2 1
, 
where legal origin dummies, ORIGIN, are used as instruments for ownership variables. The ownership variables, which are assumed to be 
endogenous, are: control concentration, CONT (it is centered around its mean), cash flow rights, CASH, and the interaction of control 
concentration with the strictness of insider trading regulation, CONT×INS (specifications 6.3-6.4). In those regressions c indexes countries, 
i indexes firms, and α is a constant (coefficient is not reported). The rest of the variables are: PRIVATE, the amount of private information 
trading; INS is the strictness of insider trading regulation (it is centered around its mean in specifications 6.3 and 6.4); liquidity, LMV 
(specifications 6.2-6.4); log of the number of trading periods, LNN (specifications 6.2-6.4); industry dummies, D (specifications 6.2-6.4, 
coefficients are not reported); time dummies, T (specifications 6.2-6.4, coefficients are not reported); efficiency of the judicial system, 
JUDIC (specification 6.4), investment opportunities, INV_OPP (specification 6.4; it is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels); and research 
and development expenditures, R&D (specification 6.4). All financial and accounting variables are measured in U.S. dollars. Numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% 
level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the 
sample. We drop firms from the sample if they their measure of private information trading is based on fewer than 30 trading days. We 
exclude Ireland from the private information trading sample because it is represented by only two firms. If all variables, except R&D 
expenditures, are available we set R&D expenditures to zero. At the bottom of the table we report the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test of endogeneity. To perform this test we first regress the endogenous variables (CONT and CASH in specifications 6.1-6.4, and also 
CONT×INS in specifications 6.3-6.4) on the set of exogenous variables, collect the fitted values of residuals, εCONT, εCASH, and εCONT×INS, and 
use them as additional variables in the base regression. High values of the F-test of their joint significance then indicates the endogeneity of 
CONT, CASH, and CONT×INS. Refer to Table I for definitions of variables. 
 
Dependent Variable Amount of Private Information Trading, 
PRIVATE 
Specification 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 
1.430  0.777  0.973  0.936  Control concentration  CONT 
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
-0.0113  -0.0137  -0.0116  -0.0115  Strictness of insider trading 
laws 
INS 
(0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
-  -  0.153  0.147  Interaction term of control 
concentration with strictness of 
insider trading laws 
CONT×INS 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
-1.255 -0.652 -0.887 -0.863  Cash flow rights  CASH 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
-  -0.00237  -0.00247  -0.00273  Liquidity MV 
 (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
-  0.0135  0.00673 0.00723  Log of number of trading 
periods 
LNN 
 (0.01)  (0.29)  (0.25) 
Industry dummies  D  no yes yes yes 
Time dummies  T  no yes yes yes 
- - -  -0.00119  Efficiency of judicial system  JUDIC 
    ( 0 . 4 8 )  
- - -  -0.00141      Investment opportunities  INV_OPP 
    ( 0 . 8 9 )  
- - -  0.00466  Assets intangibility  R&D 
    ( 0 . 3 9 )  
14.420 5.280  5.050  4.930  F-test statistics of overall significance 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of firms  2,827 2,642 2,642 2,637 
50.500 18.190 17.430 13.310  Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Table VII 
Regressions of the Amount of Private Information Trading on Control Concentration, 
Insider Trading Regulation, Insider Trading Laws Enforcement, Interaction Terms, and 
Control Variables 
 
 This table reports the results of country-random effects regressions (specifications 7.2-7.4): 
c
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Z ENF INS CONT
REG INS CONT ENF INS REG INS CONT PRIVATE
ε δ γ
γ β β β α
+ + ×
+ × + + + + =
∑
=1
, 2
1 3 2 1
_                                                                                                                 
_ _ _
, 
where c indexes countries and i indexes firms. Variable α is a constant (coefficient is not reported), E[εi
c] = 0, E[εi
c εj
c] ≠ 0 ∀ i and j, and E is the 
expectation operator.  Specification 7.1 is based on OLS regression. In all specifications the dependent variable is PRIVATE, the amount of private 
information trading. Variable CONT is control concentration (it is centered around its mean in specifications 7.3 and 7.4); INS_REG is insider 
trading regulation (it is centered around its mean in specifications 7.3 and 7.4); INS_ENF is insider trading laws enforcement (it is centered around 
its mean in specifications 7.3 and 7.4); CONT×INS_REG is the interaction term of control concentration with insider trading regulation; and 
CONT×INS_ENF is the interaction term of control concentration with insider trading laws enforcement. Control variables, Z’s, are: cash flow rights 
(specifications 7.1-7.4), CASH; liquidity, LMV (specifications 7.2-7.4); log of the number of trading periods, LNN (specifications 7.2-7.4); industry 
dummies, D (specifications 7.2-7.4, coefficients are not reported); time dummies, T (specifications 7.2-7.4, coefficients are not reported); efficiency 
of the judicial system, JUDIC (specification 7.4), investment opportunities, INV_OPP (specification 7.4; it is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels); 
and research and development expenditures, R&D (specification 7.4). All financial and accounting variables are measured in U.S. dollars. Numbers 
in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level 
(based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. We 
drop firms from the sample if they their measure of private information trading is based on fewer than 30 trading days. We exclude Ireland from the 
private information trading sample because it is represented by only two firms. If all variables, except R&D expenditures, are available we set R&D 
expenditures to zero. At the bottom of the table we report the results if Breusch-Pagan test that the variance of the random effects is zero. In 
specification 4.1 we report the F-statistics of overall significance instead of  Wald test statistics. Refer to Table I for definitions of variables. 
 
Dependent Variable Amount of Private Information Trading, 
PRIVATE 
Specification 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 
0.0299    0.0273  0.0285  0.0270  Control concentration  CONT 
(0.04)  (0.07)   (0.06)  (0.07) 
-0.0105  -0.0126  -0.0114  -0.0120  Insider trading regulation  INS_REG 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
-  -  0.0250  0.0276  Interaction term of control 
concentration with insider 
trading regulation 
CONT×INS_REG 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
-0.0188  -0.000563  -0.00929  -0.00607  Insider trading laws 
enforcement 
INS_ENF 
(0.00)  (0.94)  (0.23)  (0.45) 
-  -  0.0394  0.0371  Interaction term of control 
concentration with insider 
trading laws enforcement 
CONT×INS_ENF 
    (0.07)  (0.09) 
-0.00121 -0.00569  -0.0106  -0.0102  Cash flow rights  CASH 
(0.93) (0.71) (0.49) (0.51) 
-  -0.00564 -0.00555 -0.00547  Liquidity LMV 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
- 0.00383  0.00310  0.00329  Log of number of trading 
periods 
LNN 
 (0.26)  (0.37)  (0.35) 
Industry dummies  D  no yes yes yes 
Time dummies  T  no yes yes yes 
- - -  -0.00101  Efficiency of judicial 
system 
JUDIC 
    (0.20)     
- - -  -0.00639  Investment opportunities  INV_OPP 
    ( 0 . 1 9 )  
- - -  0.000113  Research and 
development expenditures 
R&D 
    ( 0 . 9 7 )  
24.560 174.000  220.920  194.260  Wald test statistics of overall significance 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.034 0.062 0.067 0.069 
Number of firms  2,827 2,642 2,642 2,637 
-  355.480 226.000 204.180  Breusch-Pagan Test 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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